A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Arctic By Adele Buckley, Roméo Dallaire Erika Simpson, Mike Wallace Published September 15, 2010

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US Navy: JOC Kevin Ellioth

The key to a peaceful future in the Arctic is innovative co-operation. One important step Canada could take right now would be to initiate and lead international discussions on a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty in the Arctic, involving the circumpolar nations Canada, the United States, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia.

Clearly there are obstacles to including the Arctic territories of the United States and Russia, but these two nuclear powers have just agreed upon the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which is now making its way through the US Congress.

There is a rising tide of international support for a greatly reduced role of nuclear weapons in national security, which has already led to doctrinal changes in US policy, the promise of further arms reduction agreements, a review of NATO nuclear policy and the possibility of negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a treaty for their total elimination.

The US and Russia might find that the challenges posed in the Arctic—widely seen as part of the "global commons"—could serve as a useful way to extend the already-agreed arms cuts in the New START treaty and to build co-operative security mechanisms that serve to replace nuclear deterrence and facilitate a global nuclear-weapons-free regime.

According to rules established by the United Nations, an Arctic NWFZ would prohibit the possession, development, testing, manufacture or production of nuclear weapons within the zone; prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against any territory within; and establish permanent measures to ensure compliance with the treaty.

There are many regional nuclear-weapon-free treaties in force, covering the entire southern hemisphere, Central and Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, and large swathes of Southeast Asia. Already, a majority of UN members have signed or ratified NWFZ treaties, and 50 per cent of the world's land mass (including Antarctica) is governed by these treaties.

Existing treaties relevant to the Arctic case include: the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, where Exclusive Economic Zones are to be defined by undersea measurements of the continental shelves of each nation; the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 prohibiting all nuclear activity on that continent; and the 1971 Seabed Treaty prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons or support facilities outside territorial waters.

The main obstacle to making the Arctic a nuclear-weapon-free zone is that the region served as a key arena of US-Russian military confrontation during the Cold War. The US and the Russian Federation still routinely conduct submarine patrols in the Arctic Ocean, and both have nuclear-capable aircraft that can over fly the Arctic.

While the number of these patrols dropped off at the end of the Cold War, Russian bombers continue to make Arctic over-flights, supposedly for training purposes, albeit without nuclear weapons on board.

Russian leaders attach great importance to the role of the Arctic as a strategic area crucial to Russia's ability to maintain a nuclear deterrent force. Russia's Northern Fleet, based in the Arctic and equipped with highly accurate, long-range nuclear weapons, is seen by the Russian government as its most important naval asset, and it is designing and building a new generation of submarines and ballistic missiles, despite the existing primacy of its land-based nuclear strength.

Nevertheless, an effective and enforceable Arctic NWFZ would not require a major change in the nature of US-Russian relations. Rather, it would be a confidence-building step that could assist in laying the groundwork for more ambitious steps later.

The successful conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's review conference in May is one more indication that the NPT's signatories, including the US and Russia, have become more intent upon nuclear disarmament. In fact, the final document makes specific reference to a meeting in 2012 to discuss the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, during the NPT review, again encouraged several new NWFZs. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also announced that the US is now ready to support the African and South Pacific NWFZs by ratifying the treaties. It is not too soon to bring the campaign for an Arctic NWFZ to governments and civil society groups in all Arctic nations, as well as other like-minded states.

There is another obstacle that looms: Arctic states (apart from Russia, Finland, and Sweden) are members of NATO and by treaty obligation subscribe to NATO nuclear doctrine, which places them under NATO's "nuclear umbrella."

While it is persuasively argued that the extended deterrence relationships provided by NATO's nuclear-weapon states (the US, Britain and France) are now obsolete and counterproductive to co-operative security in the post–Cold War world, it is unlikely that the NATO allies without nuclear weapons will take any substantive initiative prior to the NATO summit in Lisbon this November to change the alliance's strategic doctrine.

A pessimistic appraisal is that only substantial progress in US-Russian arms control talks will create the conditions for doctrinal change in NATO's Strategic Concept. A more optimistic view is that instead of being an obstacle to an Arctic NWFZ, the NATO nuclear doctrine currently under review could include an allowance for its creation.

In any case, membership in a nuclear alliance does not necessarily prevent a state joining a NWFZ—as evidenced by the fact that the South Pacific NWFZ includes Australia, which is in a nuclear alliance with the US, while the Central Asia NWFZ includes three states that remain in a nuclear alliance with Russia under the Tashkent Treaty.

In calling for an Arctic NWFZ treaty, we are fully aware of the magnitude of the effort that will be needed, the years it might take to conclude, and the historic compromises that would be required. Here we have the overlap of the two great security threats of the 21^st century—nuclear weapons and climate change.

Canada must take this issue very seriously. Creating an Arctic nuclear-weapon-free zone will be a long process. Now is the time to launch this initiative, while the Arctic is being shaped, because this opportunity will not exist for long.

Adele Buckley is a member of the international Pugwash Council and former chair of Canadian Pugwash. Roméo Dallaire is a Canadian senator, author, and retired lieutenant-general widely known for having served as force commander of UNAMIR. Erika Simpson is the vice-chair of Canadian Pugwash. Mike Wallace serves on the board of directors of Canadian Pugwash.

editor@embassymag.ca